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One of the more exciting recent events in constitutional law has been 
the possibility of a newly coined constitutional right: a right of access to 
unproven medications.  For at least one brief moment in time, as a result 
of the litigation stemming from a young woman’s quest to get access to a 
possibly life-saving drug, that right seemed closer to reality than ever 
before.  Given the highly regulated nature of the American health care 
system, such a right promised to make profound changes in the lives of 
many people. 
That intriguing possibility was quickly snuffed out, as the litigation 
generated by the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental 
Drugs (the Alliance) moved on to a less compelling outcome.1  But the 
issues that arose during the intervening months of excitement are 
important ones and continue to be worth evaluating.  This Article will 
attempt to demonstrate that much of the claimed promise regarding a 
constitutional right of access to unproven medicines is largely hype.  For 
a variety of reasons, such a right is likely to have a relatively modest 
impact on the lives of most Americans. 
This Article will discuss in Part I the history, prior to recent events, 
of this constitutional right; in Part II, the Abigail Alliance for Better 
Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach2 case; in Part III, the 
reasons why the creation of such a constitutional right would be of far 
less consequence than many believe; and in Part IV, how the issue of 
access to unproven medications is already playing out in an area that 
receives relatively little acknowledgement—participation in clinical 
trials. 
                                                          
 ∗ Director, Office of Human Subjects Research, and Bioethicist, Department of Bioethics, 
National Institutes of Health; Associate Professor of Law, Ethics & Medicine, University of Kansas 
(on leave).  The opinions expressed are mine and do not necessarily reflect the policy of the National 
Institutes of Health or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
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I. THE EARLY HISTORY 
Back in the late 1970s, when there were far fewer celebrities than 
there are today, it was big news when movie star Steve McQueen 
became seriously ill.  McQueen had been the picture of vigor both on and 
off the screen.  In numerous movie roles, from the car chase scenes in 
Bullitt to his portrait of the cheerfully defiant prisoner of war in The 
Great Escape, he always seemed to manage to come out a winner.3  And 
even in the glimpses of his private life, he would similarly be seen 
engaged in adventurous pursuits, most often in the driver’s seat of a race 
car. 
But things began to go downhill in 1978 when he first developed a 
cough, which led to his having difficulty breathing by 1979.4  In 
December of that year, at the relatively youthful age of forty-nine, the 
diagnosis of mesothelioma, a relatively rare form of lung cancer that is 
most commonly caused by exposure to asbestos, was made.5  He 
eventually went to Mexico to receive injections of Laetrile, a treatment 
made of ground-up apricot pits.6 
The circumstances leading up to McQueen’s death in 1980 were 
merely one prominent instance of a much broader debate that was taking 
place in this country at the time.  The actor had not gone to Mexico for 
reasons of convenience, or even because he felt the Mexican clinic would 
provide superb care.  The simple fact was that he could not obtain 
Laetrile in the United States.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
exercising its authority under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA),7 had banned the distribution of Laetrile in interstate commerce.8  
It had determined that the compound had not been shown to meet the 
statutory standards required before such interstate sale.  There was  
                                                          
 3. See Barron H. Lerner, McQueen’s Legacy of Laetrile, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2005, at F5. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  Some suggest that he might have been exposed to asbestos from the racing suits he 
wore when he was racing cars.  Id. 
 6. Id.  The Food and Drug Administration has the viewpoint that there is no “uniform” 
definition of Laetrile, though it is used “generically” to refer to compounds that contain amygdalin, 
which is a glucoside that is found in the “kernels or seeds” of most fruits.  United States v. 
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 549 (1979).  The active ingredient in Laetrile is believed to be cyanide.  
Clinical trials were eventually conducted to test the safety and efficacy of Laetrile in cancer patients.  
They demonstrated substantial side effects due to cyanide poisoning and, more importantly, no 
benefit to the research subjects.  Charles G. Moertel, et al., A Clinical Trial of Amygdalin (Laetrile) 
in the Treatment of Human Cancer, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 201, 204–06 (1982). 
 7. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–97 (2000). 
 8. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 548. 
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neither proof of its safety nor of its efficacy in treating a particular 
medical condition.9 
This state of affairs did not sit well with certain groups of 
Americans.  They felt that this constituted inappropriate government 
interference with what were essentially very private and difficult 
decisions.  At the very time that McQueen was dying, a group of patients 
dying from untreatable terminal cancers had brought suit against the 
FDA in federal court.  They argued that the provisions of the FDCA 
should not apply to their special circumstances and therefore the FDA 
had no authority to interfere with their attempts to obtain Laetrile.10 
The district court hearing the lawsuit found in favor of the plaintiffs, 
determining that Laetrile, in certain doses, was both safe and effective.  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit returned the case 
to the district court and required the FDA to make a determination of 
whether Laetrile was a “new drug” as defined in the FDCA and, if so, 
whether it might come under certain grandfathering provisions of that 
Act.11  The FDA then determined Laetrile was indeed a new drug as 
defined in the Act, but that the grandfathering provisions did not apply.  
The district court, upon reviewing these FDA determinations, concluded 
that the FDA was wrong in its analysis of the most recent grandfathering 
rules, and that, alternatively, even if Laetrile was not grandfathered, then 
the FDA’s actions violated the U.S. Constitution in that they conflicted 
with the privacy interests of these patients, which protected their use of a 
non-toxic substance for treating a health problem.12 
The second time that the lawsuit reached the court of appeals, the 
court chose to address neither the constitutional issue nor the statutory 
analysis performed by the district court.  Instead, the Tenth Circuit panel 
concluded that the provisions of the FDCA relating to the need for 
proving a drug both safe and effective had no meaningful relevance to 
the circumstances of terminally ill cancer patients like the plaintiffs.13  
Specifically, it determined that in the case of such patients, who are 
going to die regardless of any other treatments they are given, “there 
were no realistic standards against which to measure the safety and 
effectiveness of a drug.”14  Accordingly, subject to some modest 
                                                          
 9. See id. at 550. 
 10. See id. at 548, 551 (describing the relief sought and discussing whether the FDCA makes 
special provision for drugs to treat the terminally ill). 
 11. Id. at 549. 
 12. Id. at 549–50. 
 13. Id. at 550–51. 
 14. Id. at 551 (summarizing the conclusion of the court of appeals). 
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requirements (such as having a doctor supervise the administration of the 
Laetrile), the court concluded that the FDA had no authority to prevent 
the plaintiffs from using Laetrile.15 
It was against this background that the case reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court in 1979.  The Supreme Court performed its own analysis 
of both the relevant statutory history and language of the FDCA.  It noted 
that the wording of the Act contained no special rules relating to drugs 
that will be used for treating cancer or any other disease in terminally ill 
patients.  Nor, in its view, was there anything in the history of the Act 
that justified reading in such an exception.16 
In its review of that statutory history, the Supreme Court observed 
that members of Congress had specifically mentioned patients suffering 
from incurable diseases, including cancer, as being members of the group 
that needed protection from “fraudulent cures.”17  The FDA had never 
interpreted the statute as embodying any exceptions for that group, and 
throughout the long period in which that unvarying interpretation was 
applied, Congress had given no indication that the FDA interpretation 
was incorrect.  Given that set of circumstances, the Supreme Court felt it 
would be especially inappropriate to overturn the longstanding FDA 
position, which was entitled to substantial deference.18 
The Supreme Court separately took issue with the conclusion of the 
court of appeals that the concepts of “safety” and “efficacy” have “‘no 
reasonable application’ to terminally ill patients.”19  Regarding efficacy, 
for example, there might well be evidence that a drug could produce 
useful results for a cancer patient even if it cannot cure the patient.  It 
could reduce pain or extend the patient’s life, among other things.  And 
as for safety, the evaluation of safety for any drug involves comparing its 
benefits to the possible harms it might cause.  That type of tradeoff could 
certainly be evaluated for drugs to be used in treating terminal cancer 
patients. 
The Supreme Court was particularly concerned about one element of 
this equation: the harm a drug might cause if people turned to it when 
there were proven treatments that had better benefit-risk relationships.20   
                                                          
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 552–53. 
 17. Id. at 552. 
 18. Id. at 553–54. 
 19. Id. at 554–56 (quoting Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234, 1236 (10th Cir. 1978), 
rev’d, 442 U.S. 544 (1979)). 
 20. Id. at 556. 
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It noted the untoward results that might take place if the plaintiffs’ 
analysis of the law was accepted: 
 It bears emphasis that although the Court of Appeals’ ruling was 
limited to Laetrile, its reasoning cannot be so readily confined.  To 
accept the proposition that the safety and efficacy standards of the Act 
have no relevance for terminal patients is to deny the Commissioner’s 
authority over all drugs, however toxic or ineffectual, for such 
individuals.  If history is any guide, this new market would not be long 
overlooked.  Since the turn of the century, resourceful entrepreneurs 
have advertised a wide variety of purportedly simple and painless cures 
for cancer, including liniments of turpentine, mustard, oil, eggs, and 
ammonia; peat moss; arrangements of colored floodlamps; pastes made 
from glycerin and limburger cheese; mineral tablets; and ‘Fountain of 
Youth’ mixtures of spices, oil, and suet.  In citing these examples, we 
do not, of course, intend to deprecate the sincerity of Laetrile’s current 
proponents, or to imply any opinion on whether that drug may 
ultimately prove safe and effective for cancer treatment.  But this 
historical experience does suggest why Congress could reasonably have 
determined to protect the terminally ill, no less than other patients, from 
the vast range of self-styled panaceas that inventive minds can devise.21 
And in making this pronouncement, the Supreme Court also had reason 
to believe that it was not totally foreclosing access to unproven 
medications such as Laetrile.  If such a drug ended up being approved by 
the FDA for testing in clinical research studies, then patients could enroll 
in such studies.22 
In reversing the lower court’s holding, the Supreme Court was 
merely upholding the FDA’s authority as given to it by Congress.  It 
never addressed the constitutional issues that had been discussed in the 
original district court opinion.  While one can treat the Supreme Court’s 
failure to address the constitutional question as merely appropriate 
judicial discretion, given the procedural posture of the case, few people 
would have expected the Supreme Court to reach a different outcome 
had it been forced to confront that question.  At the time, there was a 
great deal of enthusiasm for allowing greater access to non-FDA-
approved drugs.  Numerous amici curiae had filed briefs before the 
Supreme Court supporting the position of the plaintiffs.  And the 
desperate circumstances of the terminal patients seeking Laetrile and 
similar drugs were not altered by the Supreme Court’s decision.  Thus, 
had there been even a small hope that the Supreme Court would rule in 
                                                          
 21. Id. at 557–58 (footnote omitted). 
 22. Id. at 558. 
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favor of greater access if the right case came before it, substantial efforts 
would likely have been made to get such a case to the Supreme Court.  
But that scenario did not take place. 
Indeed, until recently, there have been virtually no judicial opinions 
supporting the existence of a constitutional right that overrides the 
FDA’s authority to control access to drugs that have not been proven 
both safe and effective.23  Thus, a great deal of interest was generated 
when the events relating to Abigail Burroughs and the Alliance started to 
build momentum in 2006. 
II. THE ABIGAIL ALLIANCE LITIGATION 
Abigail Kathleen Burroughs was a student at the University of 
Virginia when she was discovered to have squamous cell carcinoma, a 
type of head and neck cancer that usually occurred only in much older 
people.24  She first tried to get treated with the experimental drug Iressa, 
but she did not qualify for the clinical trials in which it was being 
studied.25  Her doctor at Johns Hopkins Hospital told her of another 
experimental drug called Erbitux that had shown some promise in 
research studies for treating other types of cancer.  She tried to enroll in a 
clinical trial for that drug, but again she did not meet the eligibility 
criteria because it was only being studied in colon cancer patients.26  She 
was also not able to get the drug from the manufacturer under a 
compassionate-use program, which is the usual mechanism for getting 
unapproved medicines to people who do not qualify for clinical trials.27 
Abigail died in June 2001 at the age of twenty-one, and in her 
memory her father, Frank Burroughs, created the Alliance as an 
advocacy organization that would fight for the right of patients to greater 
access to unproven drugs.28  An early step taken by that entity was to file 
a citizen petition with the FDA urging it among other things to “expand 
availability of investigational drugs to the terminally ill by allowing 
compassionate use programs to begin at an earlier stage of the approval 
                                                          
 23. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 
F.3d 695, 710 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reviewing cases). 
 24. Complaint at 2, Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d 695 (No. 04-5350), available at 
http://www.abigail-alliance.org/WLF_FDA_Lawsuit.pdf; Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance: 
Motivated by Tragic Circumstances, Families Battle an Uncaring Bureaucracy, LIFE EXTENSION, 
Sept. 2007, at 67, 68. 
 25. Complaint, supra note 24, at 7. 
 26. Id. at 10. 
 27. See id. at 6–7. 
 28. Kovach, supra note 24. 
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process.”29  That petition did not raise any constitutional claims, and the 
FDA did not respond to it.30 
Following up on the lack of results from the petition, one of the next 
steps taken by the Alliance was to join forces with the conservative 
Washington Legal Foundation in a lawsuit against the FDA to enjoin that 
agency “from continuing to enforce a policy that violates the 
constitutional privacy and liberty rights of terminally ill patients . . . and 
their constitutional guarantee against deprivation of life without due 
process.”31  The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.32 
In the complaint, the Alliance described the current system for 
getting FDA approval of a new drug.33  In general, the drug has to go 
through years of testing.  First, in a Phase I study, a few people are given 
the drug to determine how large a dose can be given until unacceptable 
side effects appear.  Then, in a larger Phase II study, researchers perform 
initial testing for efficacy.  If both of those hurdles are met, the drug may 
finally enter a Phase III study where hundreds of people are usually 
randomized to get either the new drug or some other proven treatment or 
a placebo.  During that long process, as the Alliance acknowledged, there 
are a few ways for patients to get the drug.  One is to become a 
participant in those research studies.  The Alliance claimed that the 
number of spots in such trials was relatively small in comparison to the 
number of people who might “need” the new drug. 
The second method for getting the unproven drug was to obtain it 
through a compassionate-use program, which the complaint described as 
follows: 
Existing “compassionate use” programs for new drugs, under which 
drug companies may opt voluntarily to provide drugs to a limited 
number of patients during this pre-approval period, accommodate only 
a small number of patients—again, a fraction of those in desperate 
need.  “Compassionate use” programs are small, when they exist at all, 
because drug sponsors may not charge more than a cost recovery 
amount to participants.  Promising new drugs thus remain generally 
unavailable to patients even though there is evidence of the drugs’  
                                                          
 29. Complaint, supra note 24, at 9. 
 30. Id. at 10. 
 31. Id. at 1. 
 32. Id. at 11. 
 33. Id. at 4–6. 
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safety and efficacy, and even though the patients have no alternative to 
the drugs other than to wait for their own death.34 
The district court, not surprisingly, dismissed the lawsuit, concluding 
that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim.35  With regard to the proposition 
that there is a constitutional right of access to experimental drugs, the 
court noted that the precedents cited by the plaintiffs failed to make that 
case.  In particular, the Supreme Court, in cases such as Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health36 and Washington v. 
Glucksberg,37 had merely recognized that there is a constitutional right to 
prevent things from being done to our bodies against our wishes.  That 
proposition in no way was the same as the “flip side” of the coin, 
involving the right to obtain certain types of medical care.38  Having 
concluded that no constitutional right was at issue, the court went on to 
determine that there was clearly a rational relationship between the FDA 
policy and a legitimate state interest, and thus the policy was 
constitutional.39 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, the district 
court decision was reversed.40  In a surprising opinion, the two-judge 
majority concluded that there was indeed a constitutional right at stake.41  
In reaching this result, the court applied the more recent, and more 
restrictive, of the Supreme Court’s two approaches for determining 
whether a right merits constitutional protection.42  Under that approach, 
the right must be “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition,’” and it must be “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, 
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.’”43 
In applying that test, the court of appeals noted the importance of 
first carefully describing what the proposed right is.  It found that the 
                                                          
 34. Id. at 6. 
 35. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, No. 03-1601, 
2004 WL 3777340, at *12 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2004), aff’d sub nom. Abigail Alliance for Better 
Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 36. 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (involving the right to refuse unwanted medical treatments). 
 37. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (concluding that there is no right to physician-assisted suicide). 
 38. Abigail Alliance, 2004 WL 3777340, at *10–11. 
 39. Id. at 11–12. 
 40. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 
470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 04-5350, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28974 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 41. Id. at 477. 
 42. Id. at 476–77. 
 43. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (alteration in 
original)). 
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Alliance had done a good job of narrowly describing the right.44  The 
Alliance was claiming “neither an unfettered right of access to all new or 
investigational drugs nor a right to receive treatment from the 
government or at government expense.”45  Rather, it sought recognition 
of “the right of terminally ill patients, acting on a doctor’s advice, to 
obtain potentially life-saving medication when no alternative treatment 
approved by the government is available. . . . [T]he Alliance ask[ed] only 
that the decision to assume these known or unknown risks be left to the 
terminally ill patient and not to the FDA.”46 
Applying the Supreme Court’s test to this proposed fundamental 
right, the court noted that the right to control one’s body “has deep roots 
in the common law,” including the right to self-defense and self-
preservation.47  The majority went on to determine that “[b]arring a 
terminally ill patient from the use of a potentially life-saving treatment 
impinges on this right of self-preservation.”48  In contrast to that ancient 
right was the recent origin of governmental efforts to prevent access to 
such treatments.  The first true restrictions on a person’s right to obtain 
the drugs of his or her choice did not come into being until 1938, with 
enactment of the FDCA.49  And even those limitations were substantially 
weaker than the ones that were enacted in later revisions of the FDCA.  
As the court summed it up, “[f]or over half of our Nation’s history . . . a 
person could obtain access to any new drug without any government 
interference whatsoever.”50 
As to the claimed right being “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,” the court quoted Justice Rehnquist’s observation in Cruzan that 
the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment was likely 
constitutionally protected.  It concluded that it was a logical corollary 
that, if a person has the right to make decisions about withdrawing 
treatment, then that person similarly must have the right to make 
decisions about whether or not to take a medication that might prolong 
his or her life.51 
                                                          
 44. Id. at 478. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 480. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See id. at 482 (discussing Congress’s first attempt to regulate the testing of new drugs). 
 50. Id. at 483. 
 51. Id. at 484.  In his dissent, Judge Griffith took issue with many of the conclusions of the 
majority, and particularly its determination that a constitutional right existed.  As he put it, the 
“decision to procure and use experimental drugs has never enjoyed legal protection, let alone risen 
to the level of a ‘fundamental right.’”  Id. at 497 (Griffith, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)). 
05 - MENIKOFF_FINAL 10/6/2008  8:55:37 AM 
1054 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
The court’s opinion, not surprisingly, attracted a great deal of 
attention.  The defendants filed a motion for en banc consideration by the 
court of appeals.  In November 2006, the court vacated the panel’s 
decision and granted the request for en banc review.52  In August 2007, 
that en banc review, by a vote of eight to two, affirmed the district 
court’s judgment that there was no such constitutional right.53 
In its analysis, the court of appeals first addressed the argument that 
“‘common law and historical American practices have traditionally 
trusted individual doctors and their patients with almost complete 
autonomy to evaluate the efficacy of medical treatments.’”54  The 
Alliance maintained, as a major element of its position, that only since 
1962 has the federal government regulated the efficacy of drugs.  But the 
court observed that this left out a much longer-standing form of 
government regulation, namely, that directed at the safety of drugs.  For 
the Alliance to succeed, noted the court, it must prove that there was a 
tradition of access to drugs that were not yet proven safe.55  In analyzing 
that proposition, the court found that as early as 1736, this nation had 
begun the regulation of unsafe drugs.56  And during the 270 years that 
followed, there were numerous other such regulatory efforts made at 
both the state and federal levels.57 
The court next turned to the Alliance’s claim that several common-
law doctrines supported the finding of a constitutional right.  That 
approach was similar to what the Supreme Court had done in Cruzan, 
where it used the tort of battery to conclude that there might well be a 
liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medical care.58  The doctrines on 
which the Alliance relied were the doctrine of necessity, the tort of 
intentional interference with lifesaving efforts, and the right to self-
defense.59  The Alliance claimed that all three of these supported a right 
                                                          
 52. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, No. 04-
5350, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28974 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 53. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 
695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008). 
 54. Id. at 702–03 (quoting appellants’ brief). 
 55. Id. at 703. 
 56. Id. at 703–04. 
 57. Id. at 703–05.  The court also noted that even if there were not a tradition of a particular 
type of regulation, such as regulation of drug efficacy, such lack of regulation could not obviously 
by itself be sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a fundamental right.  Such an argument proves 
too much, since presumably we would then have to conclude that there was a liberty interest in using 
marijuana, and that speed limits are unconstitutional.  Id. at 706–07 (noting that marijuana regulation 
and speed limits did not exist until relatively recently). 
 58. See id. at 711 n.19 (summarizing and distinguishing Cruzan). 
 59. Id. at 707. 
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to self-preservation, a right that would allegedly embody the ability to 
use experimental drugs. 
The court made short shrift of the necessity argument, noting that the 
Supreme Court had already labeled this as a controversial doctrine, and 
thus it was meager support for a new constitutional right.60  Regarding 
the tort of interference with lifesaving efforts, that tort was defined to 
involve preventing someone from providing aid that is “necessary.”  
Given that the drugs involved in the case had not yet been proven either 
safe or effective, it appeared to be a stretch to claim that they somehow 
could be characterized as “necessary” aid.61 
Regarding the common-law right to self-defense, the court concluded 
that “this case is not about using reasonable force to defend oneself (as in 
most cases involving self-defense), nor is it about access to life-saving 
medical treatment.”62  It noted that the use of the experimental treatments 
had been characterized by the plaintiffs as involving “enormous risks.”  
Thus, it was inappropriate to draw an analogy between using “reasonable 
force” and the use by terminally ill patients of drugs that have been 
proven neither safe nor effective. 
Having rejected the arguments in favor of recognizing a 
constitutional right, the court proceeded to conduct a rational relationship 
analysis of the FDA rules.  Like the district court, the court of appeals 
had no difficulty finding that those rules were rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.63  In making its determination, the court 
favorably quoted language from the Rutherford case: “‘For the 
terminally ill, as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its potential for 
inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by the possibility of 
therapeutic benefit.’”64  Thus, it was certainly rational for the FDA to 
enforce rules that prevented even dying patients from getting access to 
drugs of unproven benefit. 
This rather prosaic resolution of the issues in Abigail Alliance should 
not be allowed to overshadow a remaining fascinating aspect of these 
events.  Surely, the struggle by terminally ill patients to get the next 
possibly lifesaving breakthrough treatment is one with which most of us 
can empathize.  But in trying to reach that goal by litigating about a 
constitutional right to unproven medications, perhaps the plaintiffs were  
                                                          
 60. Id. at 708. 
 61. Id. at 709. 
 62. Id. at 709–10. 
 63. Id. at 712–13. 
 64. Id. at 713 (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555–56 (1979)). 
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seriously misunderstanding broader aspects of the world of cutting-edge 
treatments. 
III. WHY A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT DOES NOT MATTER ALL THAT 
MUCH 
With the Rutherford and Abigail Alliance cases as background, it is 
time to ask (and answer) a question: does all of the concern about the 
existence of a constitutional right to drugs that have not yet been fully 
approved by the FDA really matter?  The answer would appear to be 
“not much.”  While it may be overkill to characterize the debate 
regarding this constitutional right as much ado about nothing, it is at least 
the case that, in terms of the ultimate effect on the well-being of patients, 
there is far less at stake than many would suggest. 
The starting point in this analysis lies with the fundamental nature of 
such a constitutional right.  As with most constitutional rights, it would 
merely be a limitation on the powers of the government.  The right would 
therefore prevent the government from taking certain types of actions.  It 
would not, however, give any individual the power to order the 
government—or, more importantly, any private individual—to take any 
affirmative actions. 
Applying this concept to the specifics of the Abigail Alliance case, 
the only remedy the plaintiffs would have gotten, had they won, is an 
order preventing the FDA from interfering (within the limits established 
by the constitutional right) with their efforts to obtain the drugs they 
were seeking.  The FDA would not have been ordered to take any active 
measures to make sure the plaintiffs could indeed obtain these drugs.  
Nor would a victory have provided the plaintiffs with any right to order 
drug companies, or any other private individuals or organizations, to 
provide the drugs.  The only thing at issue was the elimination of the 
allegedly unconstitutional FDA interference with their attempts to get 
these drugs. 
Given that explanation of what was at stake, an obvious question 
arises: what specifically was the FDA doing that interfered with the 
ability of the plaintiffs to get the drugs?  An examination of the facts 
suggests that the FDA “interference” was much more subtle than one 
might guess from hearing the claims of the plaintiffs and their supporters. 
Before beginning that examination, an elaboration on the rules 
relating to access to non-FDA-approved medications is necessary.65  
                                                          
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 33–34. 
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Since these drugs have not yet been approved by the FDA for any use, 
the most common way to legally obtain them is to participate in the type 
of research study known as a clinical trial.  Those trials have complex 
eligibility criteria, and there are many reasons why a person with a 
particular disease would not qualify for a particular protocol.66 
One such reason that bears special mention is the fact that a clinical 
trial would usually be studying a new drug as a treatment for only one 
disease, such as a particular form of cancer.  But new cancer drugs are 
often eventually found to be useful in treating a variety of different 
cancers.  Thus, a person with a type of cancer that is different from the 
one being studied in the clinical trial might have reason to want access to 
the drug.  This is exactly what happened to Abigail Burroughs in her 
attempt to be treated with Erbitux.  The drug was at that time being 
studied as a treatment for colorectal cancer, but she had head and neck 
cancer.67 
People in Abigail’s circumstances, who want access to an 
unapproved drug but are unable to participate in a clinical trial, are not 
always completely out of luck.  The FDA has created procedures, some 
of them long-standing, for allowing these people to get access to 
unapproved drugs.68  One such procedure is informally referred to as a 
compassionate-use investigational new drug application (IND).69  This 
procedure is designed to allow access by a large number of patients to an 
unapproved drug.  It has a variety of requirements that must be met 
before such an application could be approved, including that the drug has 
to be intended for treating a serious or life-threatening disease, that there 
are no comparable or otherwise adequate treatments already available, 
and that a clinical trial evaluating the drug is already taking place.70  Also 
there are other FDA procedures, such as one for getting access under 
                                                          
 66. One important side issue should be mentioned here.  Being enrolled in a clinical trial does 
not automatically give a patient access to a drug.  Many such trials are randomized studies, and thus, 
depending on the arm of the study to which a person is randomized, that person may end up being 
assigned to standard care and not to the experimental drug that he or she really wants.  Given that 
circumstance, if there are other good ways to obtain access to the drug, but those ways require that a 
person first be found ineligible for an on-going clinical trial, the person might have an incentive to 
intentionally make him or herself ineligible or to lie about certain aspects of his or her medical 
condition in order to be categorized as ineligible.  This might then lead to difficulty in recruiting 
patients for these trials.  See infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 67. Complaint, supra note 24, at 6–7. 
 68. See Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs for Treatment Use, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,147, 
75,148–49 (proposed Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312) [hereinafter Expanded 
Access] (reviewing procedures). 
 69. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(a) (2008). 
 70. Id. § 312.34(b)(i)–(iii). 
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emergency-use conditions,71 that are viewed by the FDA as more 
appropriate for use in obtaining access for individual patients.72 
The FDA, while in the midst of the Abigail Alliance litigation, issued 
a proposal to amend these expanded-access rules.73  It no doubt was 
feeling pressured not only by the litigation, but also by efforts in 
Congress to change the law so that patients would have greater access to 
unapproved drugs.  In fact, several years earlier, as part of the Food and 
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), Congress 
had highlighted the agency’s authority to grant such access.74  
Presumably, by proposing these new rules, the FDA would lessen the 
likelihood that Congress would impose its own solution by taking action 
that went beyond what it did in 1997. 
In any event, the proposed new rules, by the FDA’s own description, 
suggest that the agency was not really changing things a great deal.75  
The FDA noted that it had been the target of a variety of criticism 
regarding its administration of the existing rules, “includ[ing] 
inconsistent application of access policies and programs and inequities in 
access based on the relative sophistication of the setting in which a 
patient is treated or on the patient’s disease or condition.”76  The 
proposed new rules describe “in detail” the criteria for expanded access.  
The FDA indicated that its primary goal in promulgating these changes 
was “to increase awareness and knowledge of expanded access programs 
and the procedures for obtaining investigational drugs.”77  Thus, it was 
not so much that the underlying rules were being changed, but rather that 
people would become more aware of the already-existing options for 
getting access to unapproved drugs. 
Were the existing FDA rules a major—or even significant—factor in 
preventing the plaintiffs in the Abigail Alliance lawsuit from getting 
                                                          
 71. See id. § 312.36. 
 72. Expanded Access, supra note 68, at 75,148–49. 
 73. Id. at 75,147. 
 74. Id. at 75,149. 
 75. Expanded Access May Force Clinical Trial Changes, GUIDE TO GOOD CLINICAL PRAC., 
May 2007, at 2, 2 (quoting Scott Gottlieb, a former FDA deputy commissioner, as saying that the 
new regulations “basically just codified what the agency already was doing”). 
 76. Expanded Access, supra note 68, at 75,149. 
 77. Id.  The rules go on to note that 
[i]ncreased knowledge and awareness about expanded access options should make 
investigational drugs more widely available in appropriate situations.  Clearly articulated 
procedures for obtaining investigational drugs for treatment use should ease the 
administrative burdens on individual physicians seeking investigational drugs for their 
patients, as well as the burdens on sponsors who make investigational drugs available for 
treatment use. 
Id. 
05 - MENIKOFF_FINAL 10/6/2008  8:55:37 AM 
2008] BEYOND ABIGAIL ALLIANCE 1059 
access to the drugs they sought?  An examination of the complaint helps 
to answer that question.  The complaint gave details regarding the 
circumstances of four patients, one of whom was Abigail Burroughs.78  
As noted above, the clinical trials for Erbitux, the drug she tried to 
obtain, involved a different type of cancer than the one she had.  The 
complaint merely notes that she was not able to enroll in a clinical trial 
and thus could not obtain the drug.79  It does not say anything about her 
attempts to obtain the drug under a compassionate-use program.  One 
article written about these events merely notes that “the drug company 
couldn’t provide her with Erbitux for compassionate use.”80  Thus, 
nothing in the complaint, or in any other source, appears to indicate that 
the FDA rejected an attempt by the drug’s manufacturer to supply her 
with the drug under some form of compassionate-use program. 
David Baxter, a high school student who had colorectal cancer, is the 
second patient mentioned in the complaint.81 All the complaint says with 
regard to his circumstances is that, because he was not yet age eighteen, 
he was ineligible for enrollment in clinical trials.  No mention is made of 
any efforts by his family to obtain access to unapproved drugs through 
compassionate-use programs. 
The third patient mentioned in the complaint is Alita Randazzo, who 
also had colorectal cancer, but was age thirty-five.82  The complaint 
mentions that she “did not qualify for the clinical trial of Eloxatin in the 
U.S. and was not fortunate enough to get into the drug’s limited 
compassionate use program.”83  No details are provided regarding why 
she was not able to enter that program.  In particular, there is nothing 
suggesting that any specific FDA rules, as compared to decisions that the 
drug manufacturer made, prevented her from enrolling in that program. 
Joel Oppenheim was the fourth and final patient whose case was 
discussed in the complaint.84  He had multiple myeloma and attempted to 
enroll in clinical trials involving the drugs Revamid and Velcade, but 
initially did not meet the eligibility criteria because he had received prior 
treatments for his disease.  There is no mention of his attempts, if any, to 
obtain these drugs under any compassionate-use programs. 
 
                                                          
 78. Complaint, supra note 24, at 6–9. 
 79. Id. at 7. 
 80. Kovach, supra note 24, at 26. 
 81. Complaint, supra note 24, at 7. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 8. 
 84. Id. at 8–9. 
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Thus, looking at all of the four specific cases described in the 
complaint, there are relatively few, if any, facts indicating that FDA rules 
were the reason that these unfortunate patients were unable to get access 
to the drugs they sought.  In only one of the four cases is there any 
mention of even an attempt to obtain the drug through a compassionate-
use program.  And even in that case, there are no facts suggesting that a 
particular FDA rule prevented the drug company from providing the 
drug. 
The failure to provide these facts is not an accidental omission.  For, 
even under the existing FDA regulations, the FDA is very likely to 
approve a request to provide a drug on a compassionate-use basis.  In a 
recent conversation between Harvard professor Jerome Groopman and 
Richard Pazdur, the director of the FDA’s Office of Oncology Drug 
Products, Pazdur noted that “the F.D.A. has rarely denied a patient’s 
request to obtain an experimental drug under the compassionate-use 
provision.”85  He was able to recall “only one instance in which the 
agency ha[d] done so: in the case of a boy with a brain tumor whose 
parents had refused to give him radiation therapy.”86 
Given that the FDA appears to almost uniformly approve requests 
for compassionate-use access to a drug, is it proper to conclude that the 
FDA rules are a barrier preventing terminally ill patients, such as Abigail 
Burroughs, from obtaining such drugs?  The Alliance does in fact make 
such a claim, basing it not merely on the ability of drug manufacturers to 
get the approvals, but rather on what it views as an inappropriate 
condition that is imposed on drug companies if they wish to provide a 
drug for compassionate use.  This condition is highlighted in the 
Alliance’s complaint, where it challenges the “FDA’s policy prohibiting 
the sale of investigational drugs” to patients.87  The complaint more 
specifically notes that the FDA should be required to allow drug 
companies “to charge for the drugs” they provide under a compassionate-
use program, in contrast to the current rules, which permit “only cost 
recovery.”88 
The Abigail Alliance plaintiffs are correct in observing that drug 
manufacturers are subject to limitations on how much they can charge 
                                                          
 85. Jerome Groopman, The Right to a Trial: Should Dying Patients Have Access to 
Experimental Drugs?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 18, 2006, at 45, 45–46. 
 86. Id. at 46. 
 87. Complaint, supra note 24, at 10 (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. at 9–10.  I am grateful to Peter Barton Hutt for highlighting during the symposium the 
importance to the plaintiffs of this aspect of the relief they sought. 
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when they provide a drug on a compassionate-use basis.89  The plaintiffs 
thus raise a question that merits an answer: to what extent are these 
financial limitations a cause for drug manufacturers’ refusal to provide 
drugs for compassionate-use purposes? 
There is good reason to believe that the aspects of these rules relating 
to the amount that can be charged for the drugs are not playing the major 
role in the decisions by manufacturers about whether to provide 
compassionate-use access to their products.  Drug companies have many 
more significant reasons that might lead them not to provide 
compassionate-use access.  Former FDA official Richard Pazdur has 
acknowledged that pharmaceutical companies currently have little 
motivation to comply with requests for experimental drugs.  “There are 
some companies that flat out refuse to even get involved in expanded 
access . . . . We are told over and over by the industry that the F.D.A. 
will find some toxicity in the expanded-access program, and the evil 
Dr. Pazdur will take out his ruler and slap your hand, and the drug will 
be killed.”90 
The strength of companies’ reluctance to provide drugs on a 
compassionate-use basis is illustrated by a prominent story on the front 
page of the Wall Street Journal documenting one family’s struggle.91  
Four-year-old Penelope suffered from neuroblastoma, a somewhat rare 
type of cancer, and her parents believed that an experimental drug made 
by Neotropix Inc. might help her.  The drug had heretofore been tested in 
only six human beings, and the company refused to provide the drug to 
Penelope.  And, as the article pointed out, the “Food and Drug 
Administration isn’t blocking the way.”92 
In refusing to provide the drug, Neotropix indicated that 
the drug may not be safe for a child and dispensing it would be bad 
business.  “For us to provide the drug to this child would be to put at 
significant risk a small company with limited financial resources,” [said  
                                                          
 89. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d) (2008).  These rules are described in an FDA proposal to modify 
some of its rules, including providing greater specificity on what charges may be considered part of 
“cost recovery.”  Charging for Investigational Drugs, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,168, 75,170–71 (proposed 
Dec. 14, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). 
 90. Groopman, supra note 85, at 46 (quoting Richard Pazdur). 
 91. Geeta Anand, Saying No to Penelope: Father Seeks Experimental Cancer Drug, but a 
Biotech Firm Says Risk Is Too High, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2007, at A1. 
 92. Id. 
05 - MENIKOFF_FINAL 10/6/2008  8:55:37 AM 
1062 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
a major investor].  “You could delay the opportunity for lots of patients 
to get this drug if you sidetrack it for one patient . . . .”93 
The company CEO noted that “he wanted to help, but he thinks the drug 
is too early in testing to be used safely by a child.”94 
Regarding the risks to the company from supplying the drug, there 
was concern that “the FDA [would] force Neotropix to put its trial on 
hold . . . if Penelope dies.”95  FDA officials had actually called the 
company and told them that would not happen, but the CEO remained 
concerned nonetheless.  And, indeed, an FDA official who spoke to the 
reporter had commented that “‘there aren’t any absolutes.’”96  
Presumably, the FDA would not take action to put the trial on hold 
merely because Penelope died while she was taking the drug.  But if 
there was clear evidence that the drug appeared to have harmed Penelope 
in some serious way, the FDA would certainly be required to look at that 
circumstance in deciding whether the drug was too risky to continue the 
study, at least without modification.  There is no way that the FDA could 
ever make a promise to ignore what appeared to be valid evidence of a 
drug’s risks. 
If anything, the Wall Street Journal story underplays the true extent 
of the reluctance of many drug manufacturers to allow compassionate-
use access to their unapproved drugs.  While their concern about the 
liability issues, as expressed by Neotropix’s CEO, is certainly a 
significant one, these companies often have even more significant 
worries.  As Neotropix indicated, its fundamental concern is to make 
sure that the clinical trials take place in a prompt manner and that the 
needed information is collected to allow the FDA to make a decision 
about approving the drug.  Such an outcome is not only beneficial to 
Neotropix and its bottom line, but to all of us as possible beneficiaries of 
the resulting medical advances. 
And compassionate-use access, depending on the circumstances, 
poses a risk of delaying or perhaps even derailing those clinical trials.  
There are a variety of factors underlying this concern.  A straightforward 
one is that there is often a very limited supply of a new drug.  It might be 
very difficult and expensive to make.  As a result, to the extent that some 
of that limited supply is used on patients who obtain it through 
                                                          
 93. Id. (quoting managing partner of Quaker BioVentures). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (quoting FDA cancer liaison program director). 
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compassionate use, there may end up being less drug available for use in 
the clinical trials.97 
But by far the most significant problem is that expanded 
compassionate-use access can threaten the ability of drug manufacturers 
to get patients to enroll in the clinical trials.  There are a variety of 
reasons why, if a patient has a choice between getting an unapproved 
drug in a clinical trial and getting that drug directly from his or her 
doctor in a compassionate-use program, he or she would prefer the 
latter.98  Perhaps most significantly, not all patients in clinical trials are 
actually treated with the experimental drug.  Clinical trials often involve 
randomization, with some of the research subjects receiving the new 
drug while others being assigned to get the (usually not that effective) 
standard care.  A patient with a terminal cancer who is contemplating 
enrolling in a clinical trial that offers only a 50% shot at getting the new 
drug is likely to highly prefer a 100% chance of getting it through a 
compassionate-use program, if that option is available.99 
There are other reasons for a patient to prefer a compassionate-use 
program to participation in a clinical trial.  For instance, even if a trial 
does not involve randomization, its primary purpose is still not to treat 
the research subject, but rather to answer the research question.  As a 
result, many aspects of the trial are designed in a way that the well-being 
of the research subject comes secondary to answering that question.100  
While a doctor treating a patient as part of clinical care can—and indeed 
should, as a matter of law and ethics—tailor that care to meet the best 
interests of the patient, that is not true in a research study.  The study’s 
procedures are spelled out in a protocol, which will generally tie the 
researcher’s hands in terms of what sorts of changes in treatment may be 
made to accommodate the needs of that patient.  The goal of answering 
the research question is most commonly advanced by making sure that 
all of the subjects receive relatively similar treatment.  That commonly 
means denying the subjects the right to the individualized care they 
                                                          
 97. See, e.g., John A. Robertson, Controversial Medical Treatment and the Right to Health 
Care, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 15, 17 (“Few companies conducting phase II 
studies are equipped on supply or logistical grounds to make [drugs] available to all who would want 
them . . . .”). 
 98. The issue of the tension between allowing increased access to a drug outside of a clinical 
trial, yet still being able to get enough people to enroll in such trials, is explored in depth in JERRY 
MENIKOFF WITH EDWARD P. RICHARDS, WHAT THE DOCTOR DIDN’T SAY: THE HIDDEN TRUTH 
ABOUT MEDICAL RESEARCH (2006). 
 99. See id. at 135–37 (discussing disclosure of availability of out-of-study treatment); Jerry 
Menikoff, The Hidden Alternative: Getting Investigational Treatments Off-Study, 361 LANCET 63, 
63–66 (2003) (same). 
 100. MENIKOFF, supra note 98, at 15–19, 24–36. 
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might otherwise receive from their doctors (including, for example, the 
important aspect of picking the dose of the drug that is most likely to 
treat the patient’s cancer). 
The tension between expanded-access programs and being able to 
recruit patients into clinical trials has long been recognized and has been 
a factor taken into account by the FDA in approving compassionate-use 
programs.  As noted above,101 the proposed new compassionate-use rules 
are essentially a codification of what are already the FDA’s practices.  
Those proposed rules are explicit in stating that compassionate use 
should not be permitted if it has the result of interfering in any way with 
clinical trials of the drug.102  Moreover, the congressional mandate for 
expanded access contained in the FDAMA itself contained exactly this 
limitation.103 
Nor do these considerations come as news to the drug manufacturers.  
Their reluctance to provide experimental drugs through compassionate-
use programs is not new,104 and though it might partly be related to some 
of the other issues discussed here (including liability and supply 
concerns), anxiety about cannibalizing the supply of likely research 
subjects no doubt remains a major factor. 
Given these substantial reasons supporting the existing conduct of 
drug manufacturers in being less than eager to provide, let alone expand, 
compassionate-use programs, how much of a difference would be made 
by the one change that a new constitutional right might create: allowing 
the drug companies to get greater revenues from such programs by no 
longer being subject to the FDA’s cost-recovery limitations?  Not much 
of a difference, it would seem. 
To override the existing drug company disincentives toward 
allowing substantial compassionate-use access, presumably the company 
would have to be looking at substantial new revenues from those 
                                                          
 101. See supra note 75. 
 102. The proposed new provision in the rules, 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a)(3), states as a requirement 
for the approval of any expanded-access program that “[p]roviding the investigational drug for the 
requested use will not interfere with the initiation, conduct, or completion of clinical investigations 
that could support marketing approval of the expanded access use or otherwise compromise the 
potential development of the expanded access use.”  Expanded Access, supra note 68, at 75,151, 
75,166. 
 103. Id. at 75,149. 
 104. See, e.g., MENIKOFF, supra note 98, at 6–8 (discussing historical methods of getting 
participants into studies); George J. Annas, Cancer and the Constitution—Choice at Life’s End, 357 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 408, 411 (2007) (“[T]he major bottleneck in the compassionate-use program has 
never been the FDA.  The manufacturers have no incentives to make their investigational products 
available outside clinical trials.  This is because direct access to investigational drugs by individuals 
may make it more difficult to recruit research subjects, and thus to conduct the clinical trials 
necessary for drug approval . . . .”); Robertson, supra note 97. 
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programs.  How might that occur?  Two possibilities come to mind: the 
programs might be small, but there might be very high charges to 
patients; or, alternatively, the programs might be very large with more 
modest charges to patients.  Both of these options seem of dubious 
viability. 
Consider the small program with high charges.  Since the drugs are 
experimental, it is likely that few, if any, insurance policies would cover 
these costs.  Thus, patients who wanted to participate in these programs 
would have to pick up the costs out of their own pockets.  The dilemma 
this presents for drug manufacturers is highlighted by some additional 
facts regarding Neotropix and the attempt by Penelope’s parents to get 
her treated with the company’s new drug.  It so happens that her father, 
John London, was a “successful hedge-fund executive.”105  He had 
worked for several years at one of the world’s largest hedge funds, and 
had co-founded SuttonBrook Capital, which had turned into a fund with 
two billion dollars in assets.106  Given that hedge fund managers 
commonly take home extraordinary amounts of money, even by Wall 
Street standards, it seems possible that London could himself have 
provided funding to Neotropix that exceeded the twenty million dollars 
that it was then trying to raise. 
But is this an arrangement with which a company like Neotropix 
would be comfortable?  Should the newest drugs go to those families 
with the deepest pockets?  In many ways, the facts relating to 
experimental drugs are similar to those regarding transplantable organs.  
There is often a limited supply, and thus issues of fairness regarding who 
lives and dies are highlighted, even more so than already exists in a 
health care system that fails to provide universal access.  It is highly 
unlikely that drug companies testing life-and-death treatments are going 
to feel comfortable with presenting themselves as catering to the ultra-
rich while those less well-off are unable to get access to the most 
promising, cutting-edge products. 
On the other hand, consider the option of a large compassionate-use 
program with more modest charges to each patient.  The very size of 
such a program likely increases the risk that its existence would have an 
influence on the ability of the drug company to recruit patients for its 
clinical trials.  Only if the disease being treated were extremely common 
would there be enough patients to supply both the clinical trials and the 
compassionate-use program.  And even in that circumstance, it might be 
                                                          
 105. Anand, supra note 91. 
 106. Id. 
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nearly impossible to structure the two programs so that patients had 
sufficient incentives to enter the clinical trials as opposed to getting the 
drug through expanded access.  Given that we are dealing with terminal 
diseases such as cancer, some or even many patients would likely lie or 
manipulate their circumstances so as to make themselves ineligible for 
the clinical trials, if that was a requirement for participating in the 
expanded-access program.  Thus, such large programs would likely be 
workable in only extremely limited circumstances, such as when 
enrollment in the clinical trials had already been largely completed, and 
the company was merely waiting for the results of the trial. 
The bottom line, then, is that the much sought-after new 
constitutional right would have little impact.  Yes, such a right might 
have the result of altering FDA limitations on the ability of drug 
manufacturers to provide experimental drugs on a compassionate-use 
basis.  But to a large extent, the companies already have strong 
incentives not to want to do that, incentives that have little to do with the 
FDA’s rules.  The only FDA rule whose elimination might create new 
incentives would be the agency’s barrier to a company’s earning 
substantial profits from a compassionate-use program.  However, as I 
have attempted to demonstrate, there are few circumstances in which 
such profits are likely to be substantial enough to override the existing 
disincentives. 
IV. WHERE THE REAL DILEMMA OVER ACCESS TO UNPROVEN 
TREATMENTS LIES 
Although a new constitutional right to experimental drugs would be 
unlikely to bring much change to our existing health care system, some 
of the issues raised by the Abigail Alliance litigation have continuing 
relevance.  As the preceding Part has shown, the attempt by the plaintiffs 
to get early access to such drugs poses a very real conflict between the 
interests of dying patients desperate to get a chance at any possible 
treatment, even those that are largely a shot in the dark, and society as a 
whole, which will benefit from the knowledge learned in clinical trials.  
The existing laws, combined with the reality of how drugs are marketed, 
have resolved that dilemma by giving the drug manufacturers the 
authority to strike the balance between expanded access and maintaining 
conditions that allow sufficient enrollment of subjects into research 
studies.  While those companies are thus required to make very difficult 
decisions as they determine when to grant compassionate-use access to 
one or another dying patient who sees a particular drug as a last chance at  
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treatment, that role for them is one that is endorsed by the current 
regulatory scheme. 
But those very issues raised in the Abigail Alliance litigation—in 
particular, the tension between access to unproven drugs and the ability 
to perform medical research—also exists in another scenario, one that 
may in the end prove far more consequential than the realm of non-FDA-
approved drugs. And in this other scenario, the resolution of the tension 
between helping current patients versus future patients is far less certain, 
and the legal issues are in many ways more troubling. 
This scenario is the use of prescription-only drugs, drugs that already 
have FDA approval for at least one use, for a purpose that is different 
from that approved use.  This is a well-recognized phenomenon and is 
perfectly legal.  Once the FDA has approved a drug for treating one 
disease, that drug is on the market, and doctors can prescribe it for 
treating other diseases.107  This use of a drug is commonly referred to as 
off-label use, since doctors prescribe the drug in a manner that differs 
from the labeling that the FDA approves when it allows marketing of the 
drug. 
From a purely logical viewpoint, there are good arguments for 
concluding that this arrangement does not make much sense.  If a drug 
cannot be marketed until the drug is proven both safe and effective for a 
given purpose—exactly the issue that the plaintiffs ran up against in 
urging the Supreme Court in Rutherford to grant them access to 
Laetrile—why should a patient be able to get access to a drug for some 
different medical problem?108  It might well be the case that the drug 
would be unsafe if used to treat patients with that problem, or it might be 
ineffective, or it might be both unsafe and ineffective.  Any of those 
three circumstances would appear to raise issues very similar to those 
that exist for a drug that is not on the market.  Nonetheless, it is 
recognized that the applicable laws give the FDA relatively little 
authority over the actions of a doctor in prescribing a marketed drug for a 
use that is different from the approved use.109  The doctor’s actions 
constitute the practice of medicine, and the FDA does not directly 
regulate the practice of medicine. 
The off-label prescribing of medications is not only a well-
recognized practice; it constitutes a huge part of modern-day medicine.  
It is hard to get very accurate numbers, but estimates suggest that up to 
                                                          
 107. See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved 
Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 189–90 (1999). 
 108. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. 
 109. See Salbu, supra note 107, at 190. 
05 - MENIKOFF_FINAL 10/6/2008  8:55:37 AM 
1068 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
sixty percent of the prescriptions written in the United States involve off-
label prescribing.110  Without a doubt, many hundreds of millions of such 
prescriptions are written each year. 
It is important to recognize that just because a prescription involves 
an off-label use, it does not necessarily follow that the patient is 
receiving an experimental or highly risky treatment.  Many of those off-
label prescriptions represent treatment choices that are well-recognized 
by doctors and that can even constitute the standard-care treatment for a 
particular medical problem.  It takes a great deal of time and effort—and 
often millions of dollars—to do the testing and generate the proof that 
will convince the FDA to change the labeling for a drug and recognize 
that it can be labeled as safe and effective for a new use.  Given those 
barriers, many treatments become well-accepted by doctors in spite of 
never ending up as part of the official labeling information for the 
drug.111 
But it is the opposite end of the world of off-label use that I want to 
turn to now.  While many off-label uses are essentially standard care, 
other off-label uses are the source of a large portion of the clinical trials 
taking place.  Indeed, while the Abigail Alliance litigation might suggest 
to the public that most of the new treatments being tested are brand-new, 
not-yet-approved drugs, that suggestion is far from the truth.  It is getting 
harder and harder for drug companies to find brand-new drugs.  The 
category of “new molecular entity”—a new drug that is a brand-new 
chemical, and not merely a tweaking of some already-approved drug—is 
actually becoming a shrinking segment of the drugs that drug 
manufacturers are testing.112  In contrast, the growth area is in “me-too” 
drugs.113  One company merely makes a slight change in a chemical 
compound that is already approved and marketed by a competitor, thus 
enabling it to take a share of the market for that existing drug, though 
contributing little to the development of genuine breakthroughs in 
medical treatment. 
                                                          
 110. See, e.g., Michael I. Krauss, Loosening the FDA’s Drug Certification Monopoly: 
Implications for Tort Law and Consumer Welfare, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 457, 472 (1996). 
 111. See Salbu, supra note 107, at 188. 
 112. See, e.g., James M. Hoffman et al., Projecting Future Drug Expenditures—2004, 61 AM. J. 
HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 145, 150 (2004) (“A trend of fewer new drug approvals and a shrinking 
drug pipeline has emerged and will continue for the next few years. . . . The number of [new 
molecular entities] approved peaked in 1996 . . . , but since then there has been a steady decrease in 
approvals . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 113. See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY 
DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 16–17 (2004) (“The stream of new drugs has slowed to a 
trickle, and few of them are innovative in any sense of that word.  Instead, the great majority are 
variations of oldies but goodies—‘me-too’ drugs.”). 
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While brand-new drugs represent a shrinking segment of the 
treatments undergoing clinical trials, off-label uses of existing drugs 
present a very different image.  Largely unknown to much of the public, 
they constitute the growth industry segment in clinical research.  Merely 
take a look at any of the major listings of clinical trials.114  A recent 
examination of cancer clinical trials, for example, demonstrated that over 
forty percent of the trials involved not the testing of a new drug, but 
rather off-label uses of existing drugs.115 
This state of affairs should not be all that surprising.  Many of the 
greatest breakthroughs in medicine are the result of discovering some 
new use of an old drug.  Consider how many millions of people are 
taking aspirin these days, not for aches and pains, but for the far more 
important purpose of preventing heart attacks and strokes.  And in the 
cancer field, a very substantial portion of the progress in treating or 
curing many cancers has come from new permutations, doses, and 
schedules of old stalwarts from the chemotherapy arsenal. 
Thus, for patients such as the plaintiffs in the Abigail Alliance 
litigation—people who are suffering from an incurable terminal 
disease—the last-chance therapy they are seeking might best be found 
not in a clinical trial testing some brand-new drug, but rather from a trial 
testing off-label uses of approved drugs.  Suppose that they find out 
about such a study, either on their own or because their doctors tell them 
about it and ask them to enroll in it.  An important question immediately 
arises: Should they enroll in that study? 
Given their interest in being treated with the new treatment, namely 
the off-label use, such patients should presumably compare what would 
happen to them in the clinical trial with the options they would have 
outside the trial.  As noted above, clinical trials often involve the 
randomization of subjects to two or more arms, and only in some of 
those arms will a subject receive the new treatment.  Thus, participation 
in the trial does not guarantee receiving that new treatment. 
Those considerations are identical to what takes place in trials 
involving non-FDA-approved drugs.  But the analysis changes 
dramatically as the focus shifts to the alternatives to participating in the 
trial.  As the previous Parts of this Article explained, for a non-FDA-
approved drug, it will usually be difficult for the patient to receive the 
drug outside of the clinical trial.  The very fact that a patient is eligible 
                                                          
 114. E.g., ClinicalTrials.gov, http://www.clinicaltrials.gov (last visited March 12, 2008) (registry 
maintained by the U.S. National Institutes of Health). 
 115. David B. Resnik et al., The Failure to Disclose Off-Study Treatment: An Analysis of 
Oncology Consent Forms (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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for the trial means that a drug manufacturer, even if it occasionally is 
willing to create compassionate-use programs for some of its products, is 
highly unlikely to make such a person eligible for the compassionate-use 
program.  And there is nothing legally wrong with the company doing 
that.  Nor does it appear unethical for it do so.  It is perfectly appropriate 
for the drug company to worry about making sure that the clinical trial 
enrolls enough subjects.  While of course it has its own profit motive at 
stake, achievement of that goal also is likely of benefit to society.  
Moreover, the company owes no particular duty to a person who could 
enroll in the clinical trial but would prefer to receive the drug outside of 
the trial. 
Now let us examine the situation where the trial involves an off-label 
use of an FDA-approved drug or combination of drugs.  In this 
circumstance, it is far more likely that the patient contemplating 
enrollment in the trial could obtain the new treatment outside of the 
study.  As noted above, since the drug is already on the market, there is 
no legal barrier to any physician’s prescribing that drug for that new 
purpose.116 
In asking the patient to enroll in the study, what should the 
researcher disclose about the possible option of getting the new treatment 
outside of the study?  That question does not arise in a vacuum.  There 
are a set of federal regulations that govern the conduct of most clinical 
trials, and they provide various protections to potential research subjects.  
They create specific duties that researchers owe to research subjects.117  
In particular, the researchers must obtain the informed consent of the 
subjects before the subjects can be enrolled in a study.118  And in getting 
informed consent, researchers need to inform the potential subjects about 
the alternatives to participating in the study.119 
 
                                                          
 116. The physician might of course be concerned with whether she might be committing 
malpractice in using the drug in this off-label manner.  Assuming, however, that there are no good 
alternative treatments for the patient’s condition, and that the possible benefits from use of the drug 
are reasonable in relationship to the risks it poses, it will often be reasonable to treat the patient with 
the drug.  Under those circumstances, it is highly unlikely that treating the patient with the drug will 
constitute malpractice.  See MENIKOFF, supra note 98, at 37–50 (discussing legal protection of 
patients receiving nonstandard care). 
 117. See Jerry Menikoff, Could Tuskegee Happen Today?, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y (forthcoming 2008) (discussing claims that such duties are relatively weak in certain types of 
studies). 
 118. See CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN 
SUBJECTS 297–369 (2005) (discussing informed consent generally and the role of informed consent 
in the research setting). 
 119. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(4) (2008). 
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The informed consent obligations imposed on researchers by the 
federal regulations are not especially burdensome, and in many ways 
they represent the minimal duties that a society might think appropriate 
for asking people to participate in research studies where participation 
might not be in their best interests.  The duties find their roots in the 
Nuremberg Code, the document that came out of the inquiry into what 
the Nazis did to many people in prisoner-of-war camps.120  That Code 
included the requirement of obtaining informed consent as the first and 
most substantial point in its list of ten requirements. 
Surely, if it were known that there was an alternative to participating 
in a clinical trial that many subjects would prefer, and these subjects 
were not being informed about that option, then the ethics of that clinical 
trial would be highly questionable.  Researchers would effectively be 
using a type of fraud to get people into the study.  Yet, quite surprisingly, 
that is what appears to be happening in a large percentage of clinical 
trials.  Where the clinical trial involves the off-label use of marketed 
drugs, and thus it would be perfectly legal for a doctor to prescribe them 
to patients outside of the study, it remains that people being asked to 
enroll in the study are often not told about the out-of-study option.121  
Even though the opportunity to be sure of getting the new treatment, 
instead of the fifty percent chance of that happening in a randomized 
clinical trial, would be greatly preferred by many patients, they are 
frequently not given that information. 
A recent examination of this phenomenon, as it applies to cancer 
studies listed on the federal government’s clinictrials.gov Web site, 
revealed that in more than eighty percent of the consent forms for studies 
involving off-label uses, the subjects were not told about their option of 
getting the treatments outside of the study.122  And there was no 
statistical difference between those studies that were conducted by 
private companies (such as pharmaceutical manufacturers), and those 
that were funded by public entities (such as the federal government). 
Why is there an unwillingness to reveal crucial information to 
patients being asked to participate in clinical trials?  While there is no 
proof, an obvious conclusion is that there is concern that if this 
information were given to the patients, fewer of them would enroll in the 
                                                          
 120. See 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181–82 (1949), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ 
references/nurcode.htm. 
 121. See, e.g., MENIKOFF, supra note 98, at 124–41 (discussing the legality and ethics of the 
practice of not disclosing a research subject’s options); Menikoff, supra note 99. 
 122. See Resnik et al., supra note 115. 
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studies.  The entity conducting the study would of course be less 
successful in its goals, and, depending on the type of study, society at 
large would suffer as a result of the delays in generating new medical 
knowledge. 
And this concern is far from hypothetical.  There is excellent 
evidence, for example, that when patients have a terminal disease, and 
are contemplating which treatment to get, they will opt for obtaining the 
promising-but-unproven treatment directly from a doctor instead of 
enrolling in a clinical trial where they will have a substantially smaller 
(usually fifty percent) chance of being randomized to that treatment.  
Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is the story of high-dose 
chemotherapy followed by autologous bone-marrow transplantation 
(often called HDC-ABMT) as a treatment for metastatic breast cancer.123 
During the early 1990s, a few doctors tried using this treatment on 
their patients and seemed to be getting much better results than with the 
standard lower-dose chemotherapy.124  Clinical trials were begun to 
randomize women with breast cancer between standard care and this new 
treatment to see if the high-dose treatment really was as good as it 
seemed.  But since the new treatment involved the off-label use of FDA-
approved drugs, nothing prevented doctors from offering the treatment 
directly to patients.  And that is exactly what many doctors were doing.  
The new treatment received wide publicity, and as a result of that 
publicity, it became extremely difficult to get women to enroll in the 
randomized trials.  Most women wanted the new treatment, not the fifty 
percent chance of being assigned to it in a randomized trial.  Eventually, 
the researchers were able to enroll enough women to complete the trials, 
and the results demonstrated that the high-dose chemotherapy was no 
better than the standard lower-dose chemotherapy, which produced far 
less pain and suffering for the patients.125 
That series of events is certainly far from ideal.  On the other hand, 
the solution that seems to be followed in all too many clinical trials—
assuring that there is adequate enrollment in clinical trials by denying 
prospective research subjects information about their option of getting 
the experimental treatment directly from a doctor—is both illegal and 
unethical.  Thus, this state of affairs is far more troubling than what 
happens in clinical trails involving non-FDA-approved drugs where the 
tension between the interests of current and future patients has at least 
been resolved, if not perfectly, by a set of accepted rules.  The proper 
                                                          
 123. See MENIKOFF, supra note 98, at 124–29. 
 124. Id. at 125–26. 
 125. See id. at 125, 128. 
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solution to the dilemma of research involving off-label uses still remains 
to be worked out.  Certainly, any such solution must require that 
deception no longer be a key element in getting people to enroll in 
clinical trials.  There are other legally acceptable ways to encourage 
enrollment, and an exploration of those methods deserves greater public 
attention.126 
V. CONCLUSION 
Determining the extent to which people dying from untreatable 
diseases should have access to experimental drugs is a task with no easy 
solution.  Purely from the viewpoint of the best interests of such patients, 
there are compelling reasons for and against such access.  But even 
beyond the interests of the patients themselves, there is the important 
additional factor of determining how increased access might diminish 
researchers’ ability to conduct clinical trials and determine the safety and 
efficacy of such drugs. 
With regard to drugs that are not yet FDA-approved for any use, the 
legal regime currently in place resolves those tensions in a particular 
manner.  Even if there were found to be a constitutional right on the part 
of such patients to receive unproven drugs, it would do little to actually 
alter their access to the drugs.  Such a right would merely prevent the 
government from interfering with their attempts to obtain the drugs, and 
it is the drug manufacturers, not the government, that are currently the 
biggest roadblock preventing such access.  The existing resolution may 
or may not be ideal, but nonetheless it at least appears to be one that is 
endorsed by the law and where most of the parties involved are 
conforming to the law. 
In contrast, with regard to the situation of testing FDA-approved 
drugs for new uses, the situation appears quite different.  There, the 
tension between the interests of current and future patients appears to all 
too commonly work itself out by a practice that denies participants in 
clinical trials the information they might have wanted most in making the 
decision to enroll in those trials.  Such a practice is neither ethical nor 
                                                          
 126. See id. at 239–51.  One of the more interesting approaches is that which appears to be used 
in the world of pediatric oncology.  Given that it is such a small community, those doctors have 
informally agreed to try to restrict the use of experimental treatments outside of clinical trials.  In 
essence, this creates an arrangement similar to what exists for non-FDA-approved drugs.  Id.  The 
legality of the actions of these doctors remains open to question, but the agreement nonetheless 
suggests the possibility of changing the laws so as to restrict patient access to off-label treatments in 
certain circumstances.  Nonetheless, that would clearly be a difficult change to implement and 
successfully police. 
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legal.  It is time that efforts were made to end this practice, and to come 
up with a regime that, as with the testing of non-FDA-approved drugs, 
produces a result that is reasonable from a policy perspective and 
involves neither illegal nor immoral conduct. 
 
